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Introduction
Many recent experimental and commercial multicomputers use direct-connected networks with the grid topology. The binary hypercube [8] is one of the popular grid structures. Several research prototypes and systems have been built in the past two decades, including NCUBE-2, In-]This work was supported in part by NSFC of P. R. China under grant No. 69703001 and by NSF grant CCR 9900646. tel iPSC, and the Connection Machine. The more recently built SCI Origin 2000 uses a variation of the hypercube topologies.
Efficient interprocessor communication is a key to the performance of a multicomputer. Unicasting is a one-toone communication between two nodes, one is called the source node and the other the destination node. With the rapid progress in VLSI and hardware technologies, the size of computer systems has increased tremendously and the probability of processor failure has also increased. As a result, building a reliable multicomputer has become one of the central issues, especially in the communication subsystem which handles all interprocessor communications. Among different routing (unicast) schemes, the classical e-cube routing is simple to implement and provides high throughput for uniform traffic; however, it cannot handle even simple node or link faults (due to its nonadaptive routing. Adaptive and fault-tolerant routing protocols have been the subject of extensive research in recent years ([3] , [4], [7] ). A general theory of fault-tolerant routing is discussed in [2] .
Limited-global-information-based routing is a compromise between local-information-based and globalinformation-based approaches. A routing algorithm of this type normally obtains an optimal or suboptimal solution and requires a relatively simple process to collect and maintain fault information in the neighborhood (such inform.ation is called limited global information). Therefore, an approach of this type can be more cost effective than the ones based on global information [9] or local information ([ 11, [SI) .
One simple but ineffective approach is to use distance-k information in which each node knows the status of all components within Hamming-distance-k (or simple distancek). However, optimality cannot be guaranteed, as a routing process could possibly go to either a state where all mini-mal paths are blocked by faulty components or a dead end where backtracking is required. In addition, each node has to maintain a relatively large table containing distance-k information.
Another approach is based on the coded fault information, where each node has the exact information of adjacent nodes and information of other nodes are coded in a special way. Then an optimaltsuboptimal routing algorithm is proposed based on the coded information associated with each node. The following is a summary of different coding methods in an n-cube, all of them are primarily designed to cover node faults.
Lee and Hayes' [6] safe and unsafe node concept. A nonfaulty node is unsafe if and only if there are at least two unsafe or faulty neighbors. Therefore, each node is labeled (coded) faulty, unsafe, or safe. Wu and Fernandez' [12] extended safe node concept by relaxing certain conditions of Lee and Hayes' definition. Each node is still labeled faulty, unsafe, or safe. However, a different definition is given: A nonfaulty node is unsafe if and only if there are two faulty neighbors or there are at least three unsafe or faulty neighbors, end nodes of the link faulty. Each end node of a faulty link treats the other one faulty, but it does not consider itself faulty. This overly conservative approach generates many faulty nodes that severely diminishes the routing capability of the system.
In this paper, we propose a new coding methodology. It is assumed that each node has precise information of fault distribution within a given distance d. Fault information outside distance d is coded, like the one used in safety vector. We select d = 2 as an example and the corresponding model is called extended safe9 vector. Simulation results show a significant improvement using the proposed model in terms of optimal routing capability in a hypercube with faulty links, compared with the one using the original safety vector model. We also show that the selection of d = 2 is a right one and its results stay very close to the one using global fault information, i.e., d = n.
Preliminaries
Hypercubes. An n-cube (Qn) is a graph having 2n nodes labeled from 0 to 2n -1. Two nodes are joined by a link if their addresses, as binary numbers, differ in exactly one bit position. More specifically, every node U has an address Wu's safety vector [IO] concept where each node is associated with a binary vector. The bit value of the kth bit corresponds to the routing capability to nodes that are distance-k away. The safety vector is a refinement of the safety level model.
The effectiveness of a coding method is measured by the following: (1) How fast fault information can be collected (coded) at each node. (2) How accurate the coded fault information representing the real fault distribution in terms of optimal routing capability.
Both safetunsafe and extended safetunsafe models require O ( n 2 ) rounds of information exchanges in an n-cube to label (code) all the nodes. Both safety level and safety vector need only O ( n ) rounds of information exchanges.
The order, in terms of accurately representing fault information, is the following: safetunsafe, extended safetunsafe, safety level, and safety vector. The safety vector is the latest model that has a merit of simplicity and wide-range of fault coverage. However, this model is still relatively inefficient in handling of link faults. Basically, a link fault is considered by other nodes as node fault(s) by treating two may not be connected depending on the number and location of faults. A path connecting two nodes s and d is called a niinimal path (also called a Hamming distance path) if its length is equal to the Hamming distance between these two nodes. An optimal (or minimal) routing is one which always generates a minimal path. In general, optimal routing has a broader meaning which always generates a shortest ,path, not necessarily a minimal one, among the available ones. It is possible that all minimal paths are blocked by faults. In this case, a shortest (available) path is not a minimal one. In this paper, the above situation will never occur and we use the terms shortest and minimal interchangeably. n, be the nondescending safety level sequence of nude U ' S n neighboring nudes in an n-cube, such that sli 5
In the above definition, it is assumed that all faults are node faults. To extend this definition to cover link faults, both end nodes of a faulty link have to be assigned a safety level of 0 in order to be consistent with the original safety level definition. The safety vector concept is a refinement of the safety level concept by providing routing capability to destinations at different distances. More specifically, each node U in an n-cube is assigned with a safety vector Definition 2 [IO] : The safety vector of a faulty nude is ( 0 , 0 , ..., 0). Ifnude U is an end node of a faulty link, the other end nude will be registered with a safety vector of (0,0, ...l 0 ) at nude U .
Base for thejrst bit: 
otherwise
In the safety level (vector) model, a node in an n-cube is said to be safe if its safety level is n ((1,1, ..., 1)); 0th: erwise, it is unsafe. Two properties related to safety levels and safety vectors are as follows: there exists at least one Hammbzg distance path from nude U to any nude that is exactly disi'ance-k uwuy.
Based on the above two properties, it is clear that a safe node in both models can reach emy destination node (which is within Hamming distance n , the diameter of the cube) through a minimal path. The safety vector model is an improvement based on the safety level model. It can provide more and accurate information about the number and distribution of faults in an n-cube However, the safety vector concept still cannot effectively present faulty fink information. Actually, it is not clear that an efficient coding method exists under the assumption that each node has only neighbor information. Fig. 1 shows an example of it 3-cube with one faulty node and two faulty links. In this example, the safety level of each node is either 0 or 1, i.e., a source node can only send a message to its neighbors. Clearly, by inspection, the safety level information is not accurate. For example, nodes 110, 101, and 11 I can send a message to any nodes through a minimal path that are distance-2 or -3 away. This problem is partially resolved in the safety vector model, where the safety vectors associated with nodes 110 and 11 1 are (0,1,0) and (1 ,O,l), respectively. Nodes 001, 100, and 101 still have the lowest safety level (0,0,0). The reason that node 101 has a 0-bit at the 2nd bit of its safety vector is that it has two neighbors 100 and 001 with both 0-bit as the 1 st bit of their safety vectors. However, the two corresponding faulty links (100, 110) and (101, 001) do not span on the same dimension, and hence, these two faulty nodes will not block all the minimal paths initiated from node 101 to a node that is distance-2 away.
Based on the above analysis, the direction of each fault (especially link fault) is needed to provide accurate information about fault distribution. However, this approach will dramatically increase the memory space requirement and the coding complexity. A compromise is therefore needed.
Extended Safety Vectors
Proposed Model. In this section, we propose a new approach to code fault information. In general, a good coding method is generated on the soundness of its base. In all existing approaches, the base is based on neighbor information only. For both safety level and safety vector models, the above method is proved to be effective for node faults, but not for link faults. Our approach here consists of the following two steps (see Fig. 2 ):
1. Each node knows the exact fault information within distance-d.
2. Fault information about nodes that are outside distance-d is coded in a special way.
In this paper, we show an application of the proposed model on d = 2; that is, each node knows fault information within distance-2. Information about faults that are more than distance-2 away are coded, We show that d = 2 is sufficient to handle link faults and there is no need to select a large d (this will be confirmed by our simulation results later). This model is called extended safety vector, where the first two bits of an extended safety vector (for a node) represent accurate fault information and other bits k are coded based on the (k -1)th bit of its neighbors'. Note that the regular safety vector model is a special case of this approach where d = 1. Results of our simulation show a dramatic improvement of this approach over the safety vector model in handling link faults. Extended Safety Vectors. Let esv(u) = (~1 , u 2 , ..., U,,) be the extended safety vector of node U and esv(u) = U ( ' ) , U'S neighbor along dimension i. We In the extended safety vector model, in addition to the information of adjacent links and nodes, each node has complete information about adjacent links of its neighbors. u 1 = 1 (or u 2 = 1) indicates the existence of a minimal path to a nonfaulty nodes that are one hop (or two hops) away. For the case of u 1 = 0 (or u 2 = 0), such a minimal path may or may not exist, but for a given source-destination pair (that are one or two hops away) its existence can be easily verified based on distance-2 information. We use coded information for destinations that are more than two hops away. Therefore, for the case of U k = 0, with k > 2, the actual existence of a minimal path for a given sourcedestination pair cannot be verified, that is, U k = 1 provides a sufficient condition for the existence of a minimal path to a distance-k node, but it is not a necessary condition.
To determine u 2 , node U needs to keep faulty paths of length 2 initiated from node U , i.e., a path along which there exists at least one faulty link or node. A faulty path 
., n } -{ i } . That is, any path ( U , u (~) , ( u (~) ) (~) ) ,
where k E ci, is a faulty path of length 2. If both adjacent link and node along dimension i are healthy, but there are adjacent faulty links along dimensions in ci, where ci is a subset (including empty set) of ci,, the corresponding faulty paths can be represented as ( i , c i ) . Note that information about (i, c:) is passed from node u(2) to node U . In general, each node U in an n-cube has exactly n pairs of (i, cl), de- Proof: There are two node-disjoint paths from node U to another node v that is distance-2 away. Suppose these two nodes "span" on dimensions i and j. Clearly, a path of length 2 from node U to node v is (i, j) and another is (j, i). 2. In the second round, node U constructs f(u) which is a ,1,1,,,1
list of faulty paths of length 2 based on the information collected in the first round. u2 is determined based on f(u), and then, exchanges u2 with u2s of all its neighbors.
.
In the kth round (3 5 k < n), node U determines uk based on uk-1'~ collected, in the previous round, and then, exchanges U L with uks of all its neighbors.
4. In the nth round, node U determines un based on In the example of Fig. I , if U = 111, then f ( u ) = {(l, {2}), (2, { 3 } ) , ( 3 , {1,2})}. Based on the above theorem, the second bit u2 of the safety vector associated with node 11 1 is 1. Clearly, bits u1 and u2 can be determined through 2 rounds of information exchanges among neighboring nodes and u3, 214, .,., U , each needs one round. Therefore, the extended safety vector (u1, u2, ..., un) of node U in an n-cube can be calculated through n -1 rounds of information exchanges among neighboring nodes.
Theorem 2:
The extended safety vector of each node in an n-cube can be determined through n -1 rounds of information exchanges between adjacent nodes. {i} n ci # C$ and { j } n ci # 4. In the following we show several properties related to extended safety vectors. is at least one neighbor, say node w, that has its lth safety bit set. Based on the induction assumption, there is at least one Hamming distance path from node w to any destination node, say w, which is distance-1 away. Connecting the link from node U to node w to the path originated from node w to destination node w, we construct a Hamming distance path from node U to destination node w which is distance-(l + 1) away.
Examples and Properties
Next we show that the extended safety vector is better than the regular safety vector in terms of accurately representing fault information (Figure 4 is such an example). Consider a vertex U in an n-cube with safety vector sw(u) = (u1, u2, ..., un) and extended safety vector esv(u) = ( u l , u 2 , ..., U ; ) , the extendedsafyty vector is said to cover the safety vector at node U , if uk 2 uk for all 1 5 k 5 n. Intuitively, if ew(u) covers v(u) at the kth bit, then the routing based on the extended safety vector has at least the same routing capability as one based on the safety vector to all destinations that are distance-k away.
Theorem 4: For any given faulty n-cube, esw(v) covers sv(u) for any node U in the cube. Clearly, U ; 5 u1. When IC = 2, based on Property 2, U:! = 1 means that there is a minimal path to any node that is distance-2 away. On the other hand, U ; = 1 if and only if there is a minimal path to any,node that is distance-2 away. Hence, if u2 = 1 then u2 = 1. The reverse condition normally does not hold. Therefore, U ; covers U ? . Assume that the theorem holds for IC = 1 > 2, i.e.,
where i E {1,2, ..., n } ,
Fault-Toierant Routing
Basic Idea. The routing algorithm is similar to the one in [lo] . Suppose that source node s, with safety vector (SI, sg, ..., sn), intends to forward a message to a node that is distance-k away. (sp), st), ..., sg') is the safety vector of neighbor di). The optimality is guaranteed if the kth bit of its safety vector is 1 ( s k = 1) or one of its preferred neighbors' (along dimension i ) (IC -. 1)th bit is 1, i.e., stil = 1, 1 5 i 5 n. Routing starts by forwarding the message to a preferred neighbor where the (k -1)th bit of its safety vector is one, and this node in turn forwards the message to one of its preferred neighbors that has 1 in the (k -2) th bit of its safety vector, and so on. If the optimality condition fails but there exists a spare neighbor that has one in the ( k + 1)th bit of its safety vector, the message is first forwarded to this neighbor and then the optimal routing algorithm is applied. In this case, the length of the resultant path is the Hamming distance plus two. We call this result suboptimal.
Routing Algorithms. The routing process consists of two parts: unicastingatsourcenode is applied at the source node to decide the type of the routing algorithm and to perform the first routing step. unicastingat-intermediatenode is used at an intermediate node. In the proposed routing process, a navigation vector, N = s @ d, is used which is the relative address between the source and destination nodes. This vector is determined at the source node and it is passed to a selected neighbor after resetting or setting (using H(2)) the corresponding bit i in N . tor associated with the message. If this intermediate node is distance-(k + 1) away from the destination node (this distance can be determined based on the number of 1's in the navigation vector), a preferred neighbor which has 1 in the kth bit of its safety vector is selected. When a node receives a message with an empty navigation vector, it identifies itself as the destination node by terminating the routing process and by keeping a copy of this message. Note that, at the source node, if both conditions for optimal and suboptimal routing fail, the proposed algorithm cannot be applied. This failure state can be easily detected at the source node. The cause of failure could be either too many faults in the neighborhood or a network partition.
Performance Evaluation
The simulation study focuses on the following three aspects.
(1) Percentage of optimal/suboptimal routing. (2) Comparison of safety vector and extended safety vector in terms of routing capability. (3) Performance results when d = k (other than k = 2), i.e., each node knows the exact fault information that is within distance-k.
Percentage of optimal routing is measured by the probability of an optimal routing using the proposed approach for two randomly selected source and destination nodes. Again, an optimal routing to a distance-k destination is possible if s k = 1 for the source node or stil = 1 for the source node's preferred neighbor along dimension i. In addition, suboptimal routing is feasible, if stil = 1 for the source node's spare neighbor along dimension i. When the source and destination nodes are separated by 1-or 2-hop, optimal routing can be decided directly from the distance-1 and distance-2 information at the source node. Note that a minimal path may exist even when s1 and sa are both zero.
Routing capability of safety vector and extended safety vector is compared mainly under the above two measures. Tables 1 and 2 show simulation results for 8-cubes and 10-cubes, respectively. Each table contains three subtables for three different distributions of faults: (a) represents cases of all faults being node faults; (b) for half faults being node faults and the other half being link faults; and (c) for all faults being link faults. Within each cube, for a given number of faults, these faults are randomly generated based on the specificed distribution of link and node faults. We selected 100 different fault distributions for each case. For a given fault distribution, we randomly selected 200,000 source and destination pairs. Percentage of the actual optimal routing is also reported (in the second column of each subtable). This also corresponds to cases when global fault information is given, i.e., d = n. Percentage of optimal routing, when distance-3 information is given, is shown in the third column of each subtable.
Based on results in Tables 1 and 2 , the percentage of optimal routing under the extended safety vector model (when d = 2) stays very close to the one with global information (when d = n) for all cases. That is, the model for d = 2 is sufficient. Note that when all faults are node faults, the safety vector and the extended safety vector models are the same. However, as the percentage of link faults increases, the results for the safety vector model deteriorate quickly, especially for large numbers of faults. For example, when there are 75 link faults (no node faults) in a IO-cube, the percentage of optimal routing is only 35.82 percentage. For the extended safety vector model, the percentage of optimal routing remains high, especially when there is a high percentage of link faults. The summation of percentages of optimal (Op) and suboptimal (SubOp) routing corresponds to the percentage of the applicability of the corrsponding approach, which is either safety vector (d = 1) or extended safety vector (d = 2).
Conclusions
We have proposed a new coding method of limited global fault information in an n-cube. First each node collects precise fault information within distance-d, and then, fault information about nodes that are more than distance-d is coded in a special way. A model, called extended safety vector, has been proposed which is extended from the safety 270 level and safety vector models to better handle link faults. The extended safety level model has been used to achieve optimal and suboptimal routing in an n-cube. A simulation study has been conducted based a<n 
